

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

Memorandum of Conversation

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POB

ACD/ /MDC-721109-1231

DATE: November 9, 1972

SUBJECT: SALT TWO

COPY NO. SERIES B

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Jacques Jessel, Counselor, Embassy of France
Mr. William T. Shinn, Jr., ACDA/IR

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Mr. Jessel came in at his request to discuss prospects for SALT TWO. I stressed the exploratory nature of the first session noting that instructions for the delegation had not yet been approved.

Mr. Jessel showed special interest in the effect of the Jackson Amendment and he asked about prospects for the SALT talks referred to in the Joint Resolution. I noted that this latter provision had been introduced as an amendment by Senators Cranston and Taft and that it seemed in general conformity with the Preamble to the ABM Treaty which declared the intention of the Parties to take effective measures for the reduction of strategic arms. The US Delegation might wish to explore the Soviet attitude toward reductions in Geneva.

In reply to several questions on FBS, I reviewed the basic Soviet position during SALT ONE, recalling the Helsinki formula and the NAC discussions on the subject in the spring of 1971. Jessel was noncommittal on the French attitude toward FBS, mentioning only that there had been an instruction from Paris in the spring of 1971 to make clear that French nuclear forces should not be discussed in SALT.

This led to a brief discussion of the Soviet unilateral statement of May 17/26. Jessel said that while there was little chance that the French would have more than five nuclear missile submarines.

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by the time the Interim Agreement expired, more could be built in the future. He asked what we would do if the Soviets then claimed a right to build additional submarines of their own. I said this would undoubtedly be regarded as a serious violation calling into question the continued existence of any agreement that might then be in force. I assured Jessel we had no intention of negotiating on French nuclear forces. We also could not agree to give the Soviets rights which depended on the actions of third countries.

In response to his query on NAC consultations, I said that we hoped to circulate a statement within the next few days and to follow this up by one or two sessions in Brussels.

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